Second, the Bonn negotiations were kept on track (and fundamentally did not fail) by strong international pressure to reach an agreement quickly and ensure the timely implementation of the Bonn roadmap over the next three years. Although the 2014 presidential elections are an ultimate deadline for all negotiations before the elections, their success is by no means certain. Much has happened in Afghanistan since 2001, and there is increased uncertainty about the country`s political future as the passage of the security law is over, the conflict with the Taliban continues – despite attempts to start a reconciliation dialogue in Qatar, the withdrawal of international troops and the upcoming presidential elections in 2014. Although the situation on the ground is very different from that of the signing of the Bonn Agreement almost a dozen years ago, the Bonn experience may, to some extent, influence current thinking on Afghanistan`s imminent political transition. In many ways, the first mistake began before the Bonn conference, at which United Nations headquarters postponed its convening until the end of November 2001, despite calls from my Office to convene such a meeting in October before the fall of the Taliban. This delay allowed the Northern Alliance (NA) to take two-thirds of the country, thus presenting the participants in Bonn with a fait accompli. This led to the NA`s successful claim to the lion`s share of the ministries of the interim administration, which allowed warlords and NA commanders to retain or be appointed many provincial and district governors, as well as key positions in the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP). The return to power of individuals widely despised and feared by most Afghans for the atrocities and slander that had marked their rule in the mid-1990s meant that bad governance and corruption became the norm from the beginning. « Many of the difficulties faced last year in implementing the Bonn Agreement are the result of the catastrophic state of Afghanistan`s civilian and state institutions after two decades of war, » Adams said. « But the Afghan warlords are mainly responsible for sabotaging the agreement. The international community is also to blame for failing to provide the necessary assistance to Afghans trying to make the agreement a success.

Fourth, the international community`s engagement in Afghanistan was just beginning and intensified in late 2001, while next year`s presidential elections will be held in parallel with the international military withdrawal from Afghanistan and the decline in international financial support. The 2001 Bonn Agreement provided for an agreed transfer of power from one nominal head of State, Burhanuddin Rabbani, to another, Hamid Karzai, after the fall of the Taliban regime and took place without significant violent conflicts both during the negotiations and during the three-year period of the Bonn Process. This is extraordinary considering that over the past century there have been changes of direction in Afghanistan through assassinations, coups, forced exiles and, between 1978 and 2001, devastating wars and civil wars. Given that a peaceful transfer of power is also a primary goal of the current political transition, it is worth reviewing some key elements of the Bonn experience: a 12-page background paper titled « The Bonn Agreement in Afghanistan: A Catalogue of Missed Opportunities, » released today by Human Rights Watch, analyzes conditions in the country one year after the agreement. which formalized the end of the Taliban regime. The briefing paper outlines a number of areas where the Afghan government and international actors have missed opportunities to improve security and protect human rights. Human Rights Watch makes several recommendations to international and Afghan actors to help them implement key provisions of the agreement. After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, the Bonn Agreement laid the foundation for US- and NATO-backed state-building efforts in Afghanistan.

The agreement aimed to create a new constitution, an independent judiciary, free and fair elections, a centralized security sector, and the protection of the rights of women and minorities such as religious and ethnic groups. This model of state-building in Afghanistan was based on a « maximalist model of post-conflict reconstruction » that emerged in the 1990s as a result of international interventions in the Balkans, sub-Saharan Africa and East Timor. [4] The Bonn Agreement (officially the Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan pending the restoration of permanent governmental institutions) was the first set of agreements adopted on December 5, 2001, aimed at restoring the Afghan state after the US invasion of Afghanistan in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. As there had been no nationally agreed government in Afghanistan since 1979, it was considered necessary to have a transitional period before a permanent government was established. A nationally agreed Government would require that at least one Loya Jirga be convened; However, in the absence of law and order following the swift victory of the North American and Afghan Alliances, immediate action was deemed necessary. « One year later, the Bonn Agreement still represents Afghanistan`s best chance to end chronic instability, violence, and a history of massive human rights violations, » said Brad Adams, executive director of Asia at Human Rights Watch. « But many of the promises in the deal were not kept last year. The international community has missed several good opportunities to marginalize local military leaders and to better promote security and the protection of human rights. Third, the Afghan government was devastated by two decades of protracted conflict in 2001 and had no impact on Bonn.

Now the government has built considerable capacity and power that can be used to influence the current political transition. The Bonn Agreement was signed on 5 December 2001 by representatives of various anti-Taliban factions and political groups. It has established a road map and timetable for the establishment of peace and security, the reconstruction of the country, the re-establishment of some key institutions and the protection of human rights. The agreement contains provisions on military demobilization and integration, international peacekeeping and human rights monitoring. In December 2001, 25 eminent Afghans met under the auspices of the United Nations in Bonn, Germany, to decide on a plan for the government of the country (see List of signatories to the International Conference on Afghanistan, Bonn (2001)). By inviting warlords capable of disrupting the state-building process, a « big tent » strategy has been implemented to involve these non-state actors in centralizing the Afghan state rather than alienating them. [1] Accordingly, on 22. In December 2001, the Afghan Interim Authority (AEOI), composed of 30 members under the leadership of a President, was inaugurated with a six-month term, followed by a two-year transitional authority, after which elections were to be held. If we reflect on these questions, we will probably learn more about the mindset of some of the actors of the Bonn era, who are still important political actors today, than about how the political transition could actually unfold in 2014.

While some are in love with behind-the-scenes negotiations, the pre-allocation of ministerial and other high-level positions, and perhaps even the hope that an external entity will serve as a « broker, » the key factors that made the Bonn process viable and maintained it for three years are no longer there. Whatever decision is made in advance, things could go off the rails before, during or after the 2014 presidential election. Moreover, agreements between different political actors and groupings (sometimes referred to as « national programmes ») would not necessarily have the strength and strength supported by the international community of the Bonn Agreement. Thus, while there may be similarities with some of Bonn`s features, a Bonn-like scenario for the current political transition seems unlikely. Nevertheless, the Bonn experience provides an enlightening counterpoint for weaving and informing reflection on 2014. First, all aspects of the Bonn Agreement were concluded at the signing of the meeting, including the election of the interim Head of State. A national presidential election is a fundamentally different process. The past three years, and especially the previous ones, have opened the eyes of Western governments to the sad realities in Afghanistan. And yet, despite the arrival of a new administration in Washington, there are questions about the persistent lack of foresight in the West.

The growing insurgency in southern and eastern Afghanistan had to turn the 2009 presidential elections and the 2010 parliamentary elections into horror scenarios. Some of us had warned that the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) was far from independent, as its members had all been appointed by the president by a distorted interpretation of the relevant provision of the constitution, while the security situation would prevent genuine elections in half of the country`s Pashtun districts, leading either to colossal fraud, if they were included, or to deprive large sections of the largest ethnic group of their rights if they were excluded. Given that the conditions for credible elections are not met, it seemed desirable to convene a round table in early 2009, composed of key Afghan personalities as well as representatives of parliament and civil society, to decide on the way forward. .