Fourth, AUKUS adds a new and powerful minilateral institutional component to the regional security architecture at Canberra`s disposal. In addition to the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TDS) with Japan and the Quad (with India), these « minilaterals » are crucial diplomatic instruments for Canberra to exert its influence at the regional level. These build on a wide range of bilateral strategic partnerships that Canberra has forged with competent and like-minded countries such as Japan, India and Singapore, which once again add an extra layer to the regional security architecture[14]. This does not mean that Canberra is less engaged in multilateral security dialogue organisations such as the ASEAN series of institutions – the East Asia Summit (EAS) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) – but these serve a different purpose than targeted minilaterals such as AUKUS and those mentioned above. Inclusive and mainly supra-regional institutions such as EAS and ARF should suffer from a lack of consensus and effectiveness in addressing urgent security challenges. In other words, AUKUS is more of a useful action shop than another talking shop. At this stage, neither the text of the AUKUS Security Pact nor its specific mechanisms have been developed. Nevertheless, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (AEA), which regulates the export of nuclear expertise, materials and technology from the United States, will shape Washington`s obligations under the agreement. (Lawfare has already looked at international nuclear cooperation under the AEA.) In addition, Australia may need to update its existing IAEA safeguards to ensure that its measures are considered compatible with the NPT. The Aukus alliance is probably the most important security agreement between the three nations since World War II, according to analysts.

Australia first signed a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA in 1974 and acceded to the Additional Protocols in 1998. Together, the Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocols provide the IAEA with the necessary powers and freedom of action to carry out its verification mandate. In particular, the IAEA is able to request the necessary information from the Government and to monitor and verify Australia`s civilian nuclear programme by conducting short-term inspections and additional access visits and by taking environmental samples as required. Applicable provisions of the AEA include 42 U.S.C§ §§ 2153, 2121(c), and 2164. Together, these three sections allow the United States. Share government, limited nuclear technology and expertise with a foreign country, as long as that country maintains IAEA safeguards and ensures the physical security of materials, and the President notes that such cooperation promotes and does not pose an undue risk to U.S. national security interests. Prime Minister Boris Johnson said the deal would create « hundreds of highly skilled jobs » and « preserve security and stability in the world, » but said the relationship with France was « rock solid. » [7] Conservative MP Tom Tugendhat said: « After years of intimidation and trade hostility and after seeing regional neighbours like the Philippines see interference in their waters, Australia had no choice, just like the US or the UK [to make the deal]. » [94] Former Prime Minister Theresa May questioned whether the UK would be forced into war with China in the event of an invasion of Taiwan. [95] On September 15, 2021, the Heads of State or Government of Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States announced the creation of an enhanced trilateral security partnership called « AUKUS »[1].

The agreement committed the parties to « significantly deepen cooperation on a range of security and defence capabilities » to be achieved through « further integration of science, technology, industrial fundamentals and supply chains related to security and defence »[2]. They also announced that the « first initiative » of this program would be a commitment between Britain and the United States to provide Australia with a flotilla of nuclear-powered submarines (SSN). This ended Canberra`s existing contract with French supplier Naval Group, which had become increasingly impractical and was seen as unsuited to Australia`s revised defence needs. On September 15, the United States, Britain and Australia announced a trilateral security pact called AUKUS. Under the deal, Australia has terminated its Attack-class diesel-electric submarine contract with French manufacturer Naval Group and will instead purchase British or US nuclear-powered attack submarines. In a broader sense, the alliance is intended to counter Chinese military expansion. The first is the obvious symbolism of AUKUS. The fact that a middle power like Australia gains a place at the top with a great power Britain and an American superpower is a serious diplomatic achievement for the Morrison government[8].

Having « great and powerful friends » is a significant advantage for Australia as its national security has always been more than partially dependent on them.[9] AUKUS serves to anchor more and more firmly the strategic presence of America and Britain in the South Pacific. Even in the absence of a trilateral alliance treaty, AUKUS lends credibility to expectations of mutual support between the three sides, perhaps even in the worst-case scenarios of conflict. This reinforces existing reassurance for Australia through the ANZUS alliance and the Five Powers Defence Arrangement (FPDA), to which the UK (as well as a close strategic partner; Singapore, contractor; New Zealand and Malaysia). With powerful backers like the US and Britain, a hostile power should include such support in any calculation of a possible attack on Australia, even if there is no formal trilateral treaty document. At least that`s Prime Minister Morrison`s tacit aspiration when he called it an « eternal partnership. » The Australian prime minister said one of the drivers of the deal was the growing security challenges in the Indo-Pacific. None of them use the term « alliance » to characterize the trilateral agreement. This is reasonable because it is below the threshold of a bona fide military alliance, commonly understood by experts as: « a formal association of states for the use (or non-use) of military force in certain circumstances against states outside their own members »[4]. Most important is the absence of a formal mutual defence treaty that commits the parties to military support in the event of conflict – the usual sine qua non for a genuine military alliance (such as NATO Article V). Given that defence technological cooperation was at the heart of AUKUS` disclosure, it could be called a « defence pact », if only in the technological sense and not in the traditional conception of a mutual defence treaty. The three countries said the agreement would « help maintain peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific. » Some experts have suggested that the AUKUS agreement signals a paradigm shift in US strategy and policy throughout the Indo-Pacific region. The NSS certainly point to a shift in Australia`s approach to ensuring regional security, if not a new calculation of the challenges we face. In this regard, the AUKUS Security Pact is part of a quest for security and stability in increasingly volatile geopolitical times.

On the 15th. In September 2021, a new security pact was signed between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States of America (AUKUS). This trilateral agreement will now allow Australia to have nuclear-powered submarines, making it the 7th country to have access to such technology. A 1999 defence deal that would provide Australia with nuclear submarines two decades later would have been wise. Australia would have received its 12 boats by 2020, when China would have completed its transformation into a hostile actor. However, we are now in 2021 – not 1999. Preparations for a new EU-US Trade and Technology Council between the US and the EU have been postponed. [130] France finally renounced its opposition to these talks, which took place in Pittsburgh on September 29, 2021. France has also tried to delay free trade negotiations between the EU and Australia. [167] Apparently, « most of Europe felt that transatlantic relations were too important to be sacrificed to The French Sting »; like the countries of Northern Europe that advocate free trade, as well as the countries of Eastern Europe that favor security relations with Washington, which « resented the French attempt to impose its indignation on the rest of the bloc ». [168] Among the main proponents of the TTC negotiations were Margrethe Vestager, the EU`s chief digital officer, who advocates open markets, and Valdis Dombrovskis of Latvia, the EU`s chief of trade, who sees the US alliance and NATO as an important counterweight to Russia and China. [169] [168] [170] Lithuanian Deputy Minister of European Affairs Arnoldas Prankevicius proclaimed, « What is important is the maintenance of transatlantic unity, because we believe that this is our greatest strength and value, especially vis-à-vis countries like Russia and China. » [167] China condemned the agreement as « extremely irresponsible. » Overall, the Australian government seems to view benefits as costs primarily, as many of the risks described above are already factors in their current calculations, nuclear submarine or not.

Although AUKUS is still in its infancy and developments are developing rapidly, it has engaged the three countries in tangible security cooperation and, according to Richard Maude[29], constitutes a « turning point in Australia`s long adaptation to an Indo-Pacific region transformed by China`s power and assertiveness. » At the very least, Australia will be better prepared thanks to AUKUS, which is armed with superior weapon platforms, if the worst-case scenario materializes. Canberra only has to hope that such a scenario does not happen before 2040! Currently, only six countries – all nuclear-weapon states – have nuclear-powered submarine capabilities. These include five SIGNATORIES TO THE NPT (United States, United Kingdom, Russia, China and France) and India. .